“I stopped in elementary school, but I already knew how to shoot with a Kalashnikov. We were training in the neighborhood.”
A Basra resident, former militiaman1
Since the crash of the Islamic State (ISIS) in autumn 2017, Iraqi
news has been regularly punctuated by episodes of demonstrations and
riots on a background of basic social demands (for access to electricity
and drinking water, and for jobs) as well as denunciation of corruption
among political staff.
However, this context of peace and finally restored national harmony
opened a period particularly favorable to initiate reforms and try to
meet the immense social expectations of the population. A precious
political capital that the government has squandered in a few months
through intense inaction. The anger and frustration of the people are,
once again, boundless. The efforts and sacrifices made during the war
against the Caliphate were in vain. Over the months, waves of
mobilization, violence and the determination of the demonstrators seem
to be increasing: riots, fires and clashes with the security forces are
increasingly shaking the country. Until October 2019, when the protest
movement entered a new phase, on a larger scale, but with different
practices. While the government is more than ever in the spotlight, we
know however that the State will be preserved.
A COUNTRY IN RUINS
War after war, ruins upon ruins. From 2014 to 2017, the northern half of
Iraq, with a Sunni majority, is once again ravaged by fighting, first
while being rapidly conquered by ISIS (which stops 100 km north of
Baghdad), then while being very slowly liberated.
The cost of destruction related to this conflict is estimated by the
World Bank at $45.7 billion in January 2018. In some areas, everything
is destroyed; cities are almost razed to the ground, in others there is
no infrastructure left. For example, only 38 per cent of the country’s
schools are still standing, and only half of the hospitals. A city like
Mosul was “liberated” from ISIS only at the cost of 8 million tons of
rubble and hundreds of thousands of displaced people.2
The country’s economy has obviously not been spared, particularly the
essential hydrocarbon sector, which accounts for 88% of the country’s
budgetary resources, 51% of GDP and 99% of its exports. Nevertheless,
Iraq remains the second largest producer of crude oil within the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec), after Saudi
Arabia, with an average production of 4.5 million barrels per day. Some
infrastructure has suffered particularly, for example the Baiji
refinery, the largest in the country, which only partially restarts in
spring 2018. For several years Iraq needs to import refined products
(including fuel), gas and electricity from neighboring countries,
particularly from Iran.3 Three-quarters of the water infrastructure and
half of the power plants are indeed destroyed. According to region,
Iraqis receive only five to eight hours of electricity a day, and
shortages of drinking water are chronic. In Baghdad, for example, a
quarter of the population does not have access to drinking water.
Agricultural production has also fallen, particularly as a result of the
destruction of irrigation systems, exacerbating an already endemic
rural exodus.
In 2018, the unemployment rate officially stands at 23% in Iraq, but it
is estimated to reach 40% among young people (those under 24
representing 60% of the population). In fact, there is relatively little
work in Iraq. The first economic sector, oil, ultimately provides few
jobs, especially since foreign companies hire many Asian migrants
(considered to be more docile and exploited at will than local workers).
The private sector remains weak, and in reality there are only two
branches of activity that provide jobs for the population: firstly, the
civil service, which has five million civil servants (including
retirees) compared to half a million in 2003. Secondly, the violence
sector, with the Iraqi army comprising approximately 200,000 men, and
the Hashd al-Shaabi, popular mobilization units (PMU), around 100,000.
The latter, which is a coalition of about fifty mostly Shia militias,
recruited a lot in 2014 after the fatwa of Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani4 ordering the mobilization against ISIS’ troops. Tens of
thousands of volunteers (mostly unemployed) responded to this call, one
third of them from the province of Basra. Thousands died there, and many
returned injured, sometimes amputated.5 The end of the war against ISIS
leads only to a partial demobilization of these troops. A militiaman
back in civilian life means for a family one less source of revenue and
an extra mouth to feed.
In Kuwait, in February 2018, at a conference on the reconstruction of
the country, while the Iraqi government was asking for more than 88
billion dollars, the international community promised it only about 30
billion dollars in credits and investments (in particular Turkey,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar6). But, as a result of an exceptional
corruption, which is among the strongest in the world, we know that a
part of international aid –as well as a part of the oil rent –
disappears into the pockets of local politicians. Successive governments
have reportedly embezzled nearly 410 billion euros since Saddam
Hussein’s fall in 2003, which means twice the country’s GDP.
On top of that, as Iraq at war has become familiar with debt, in 2016
the country signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and, in exchange for loans, it committed itself to taking
austerity measures (drop in the number of civil servants, increase in
electricity prices, increase in customs taxes and income taxes, etc.).
As we can see, in Iraq, the years of liberation and reconstruction are
unlikely to one day be considered glorious. Disappointment, frustration
and anger of the inhabitants seem as great as before the Caliphate
episode. Either because they certainly get no benefit for it (ruined or
displaced veterans or civilians), or because they have once again lost
everything (ISIS’ supporters, Sunnis humiliated by the Shia occupation).
It seems we are back to the status quo ante. Or worse.
THE PREMISES OF THE REVOLT (2011-2015)
During the Arab springs of 2011, thousands of Iraqis took to the streets
of many cities to express their anger against an (already) corrupt
regime and deplorable living conditions. The movement was quickly and
violently repressed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, at the cost of
dozens of people killed. Whereas the security situation seemed at all
levels definitively restored, American troops left the country at the
end of the year. Subsequently, the Sunni provinces experienced new
episodes of protest, and the government’s responses were the same: a
policing response. Enough to enhance the breeding ground for the growth
of ISIS, and to explain that a part of the population will welcome it in
2014 as a liberator.
Despite the war, popular demonstrations against corruption, supported by
part of the Shia clergy, broke out in Baghdad. In July 2015, they were
mainly led by supporters of the thundering Muqtada al-Sadr7. But in the
south of the country, in Basra and Kerbala, it’s mainly the repeated
power cuts that bring people onto the streets. To calm things down Prime
Minister Haider al-Abadi, who has been in office since 2014, merely
promised reforms… that do not come. Iraqis’ anger boiled over once again
from February to May 2016. The “Green Zone”, Baghdad’s ultra-secure
perimeter hosting official buildings8, was even briefly invaded, and the
Parliament was occupied by Sadrist demonstrators. In February 2017,
another attempt to occupy it ended this time in failure, four dead and
dozens wounded. In front of the “Green Zone”, on the opposite bank of
the Tigris, Tahrir Square becomes a symbolic place of protest. From now
on, usually on Friday after the prayer, we can see handfuls of activists
and protesters gathering, waving posters and holding meetings. But the
epicenter of the proletarian revolt lies further south.
VENICE ADRIFT
The South-East province has a population of about five million, but its
capital Basra alone has three to four million inhabitants. In theory, it
is one of the wealthiest regions in the country (if not in the world),
since nearly 80% of Iraqi oil is extracted from there (more than in
neighboring Kuwait). The agglomeration is hosting a significant
petrochemical activity and in its suburbs the only Iraqi ports
overlooking the Persian Gulf, including the deep-water port of Umm Qasr
(50 km further south). It is from this point, completely saturated, that
commodities (including foodstuffs) enter Iraq and millions of barrels
of oil are exported daily. Many foreign investors are present in the
city (e.g. French or Italian shipping companies), and studies for new
industrial and logistical infrastructures are not lacking. Nor indeed
the pharaonic real estate projects that seem to be the most delirious:
construction of five-star hotels, high-end residential units, shopping
malls, business district with the world’s tallest tower (230 floors). To
rival the likes of Dubai, as some expect. In the meantime, real
economic activity brings millions of dollars a day to the Iraqi State,
almost nothing to the region, and even less to its people.
The province of Basra has long been a major agricultural area, renowned
for its date palm trees. The Shatt al-Arab estuary, which was a treasure
of ecology wealth and developed a lush agriculture, has turned into an
ecological hell, devastated by decades of war, laying concrete and
industrial pollution – with an ad hoc incidence of cancer for its
population. But worse, between the rise in sea level due to global
warming and the decrease in river flow due to intensive irrigation
(construction of dams in Turkey and Iran, wasteful use in Iraq), we are
now witnessing an increasing salinization of land and groundwater.
“A few weeds are scattered over the cracked piece of land. ‘In the past,
everything was very green here. I used to grow vegetables, fodder for
my animals, dates and apples.’ With his four hectares of land, his herd
of about thirty sheep and his few cows, this farmer could earn up to 25
million dinars a year (about 20,000 €).‘But this year, I lost
everything. Nothing will grow. I have three children to feed, so to
survive, I sell my animals.’ Faced with the shortage of fresh water,
this 60-year-old man must now fill their drinking troughs with water
bottles.”9
Recently, the government had to ban crops that consume too much
freshwater, such as maize and rice. This contributes, as do the
expropriations of peasants for the extension of oil infrastructure, to a
major rural exodus that feeds the slums and informal neighborhoods in
the suburbs of Basra. The city’s population has increased by more than
one million since 2003. The “pace of job creation” didn’t of course
follow, and a third of the population now lives below the poverty line,
i.e. on less than $2 a day.
The city’s majestic canals, which used to be called “the Venice of the
Middle East”, now look like open sewers and floating dumpsites. Its
inhabitants have little or no access to basic public services such as
running water, electricity or waste management.10In an attempt to
overcome these problems, the governorate of Basra has directly signed
agreements with neighboring countries. Kuwait thus supplies fuel to
Iraqi power plants on a daily basis, but it is first of all out of fear
of seeing waves of migrants crossing its border. Electricity supply from
Iran is subject to risks such as American sanctions or payment
difficulties. Saudi Arabia, which wants yet to counter Tehran’s
influence, has so far made do with promises.
That does not mean that the inhabitants of Basra are resigned, but it is
true that the region retains traces of a tradition of struggle,
particularly trade unionist, and that in the past the influence of
Marxist political movements was very important there.11 Iraqi political
Shiism assimilated as many of those aspects as possible in the second
half of the 20th century (to counter the communist influence), relying
in particular on the pro-social justice veneer provided by this
religion. An insurrection like in 1991 against Saddam Hussein’s regime
remains almost mythical in many memories. The provincial capital is
therefore not, understandably, renowned for its social stability, and
demonstrations are a part of everyday life there.
THE JULY RIOTS / ELECTRICITY
Iraqi news in the summer of 2018 should been dominated by new political
developments following the parliamentary elections in May. The result of
this election, which saw a record abstention of more than 55%, was only
a fragmented Parliament with no clear majority.
The Saairun coalition (literally “Forward” but also known as “Alliance
Towards Reforms” or “Marching Towards Reform”), which could be described
as populist and nationalist, obtained the highest percentage of the
vote. It was an unprecedented alliance of Shia supporters of the
sovereignist Muqtada al-Sadr and the modest Iraqi Communist Party (the
latter, however, had only 2 deputies out of 54 elected of the
coalition).
In the second place there is the Fatah Alliance (Conquest Alliance);
Orthodox Shia and politically inspired by the Iranian model. The party
it is led by Hadi al-Amiri; political branch of the PMU [Popular
Mobilization Units] and it derives its legitimacy from its active
participation in the fight against ISIS.
The party of Prime Minister al-Abadi, the Islamic Dawa Party, is only in the third place.
If, a priori, it seems hard to reconcile one political bloc with
another, at least two of them must join their forces in order to appoint
a Prime Minister and share the power. This is particularly complex
since they must respect ethno-confessional quotas in the distribution of
posts and, finally, upset neither Tehran nor Washington. It is after a
month of spectacular negotiations and reversals that the first step is
over: an agreement to form a government has finally been reached between
Haider al-Abadi and Muqtada al-Sadr.
But while politicians in the air-conditioned palaces of the “Green Zone”
are now feverishly fighting for the allocation of ministries, Basra’s
inhabitants are facing the most serious water crisis in Iraq, as well as
frightening heat waves. With temperatures above 50°C, fans, air
conditioners and refrigerators become more than essential. But for that
you need electricity. And now on July 6th, due to unpaid bills, Iran is
simply closing several power lines, including the one that supplies
Basra. The proletarians, noting that Shia solidarity has limits, are
forced to use their age-old, costly and polluting generators. As for the
Iraqi authorities, they find no other solution than to ask the
inhabitants… to save energy.
Two days later, on Sunday, July 8th,12 a demonstration of a quite common
kind took place on the outskirts of Basra: a few dozen people blocked a
road leading to the West Qurna-2 oil field (operated by the Russian
company Lukoil) and West Qurna-1 oil field (operated by ExxonMobil),
thus preventing employees from accessing the sites. They hoped to get
some hires in this way, but the situation had escalated, and a
demonstrator was shot dead by the police13. At that moment, no one knows
that this event will set off the powder keg.
It seems that initially the local tribal sheikhs sought justice and
reparation, and then they received support from other tribes.
Demonstrations resume the following Tuesday. The next day, protesters
attempted to enter oil installations near Basra, they clashed with
security forces and set fire to buildings at the site entrance. The
tension is such that foreign oil companies are ordering the evacuation
of their executives.
Over the next two days, demonstrations took place in several cities in
the south of the country (Basra, Nasiriya, Najaf, Samawa and Karbala)
and even in Baghdad. In many cases, protesters were trying to block
economically strategic roads, linking for instance oil fields, border
crossings (to prevent the passage of trucks), airports and the port of
Umm Qasr. Official buildings were occupied. In several cities there were
clashes with the police and injuries.
On Friday 13th, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi travelled to Basra, where
he met with military, political, tribal and economic leaders and tried
to calm the population by announcing (without further explanation) that
he would release “the necessary funds” for the city. During the Friday
sermon, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, faithful to his lukewarm
balancing, supported the demonstrators, but asked them to avoid disorder
and destruction. However, at nightfall, riots broke out in several
cities. The protesters, although very respectful of their cleric, chose
to ignore his recommendations and, on the contrary, targeted official
buildings, offices of political parties and militias (except Sadrist
organizations), and sometimes even tried to set them on fire. Fighting
with the police raged all night long. Eight demonstrators were killed.
Throughout the following week, these demonstrations were repeated and
extended to other provinces in the south of the country.
What do these demonstrators want? Above all, water, electricity, better
public services and jobs. A 25-year-old man, a graduate of the
University of Basra, says: “We want jobs, we want to drink clean water,
and electricity. We want to be treated like human beings and not
animals.”14 Another man, a 29-year-old employee, says, “People are
hungry and live without water and electricity. Our demands are simple:
more jobs, desalination structures and the construction of power
plants.”15 To these basic material demands, the demonstrators add a
vague but virulent denunciation of corruption and all those “thieves”
who rule the country. Slogans a little more explicitly political also
appear, such as “The people want the regime to fall!”
Throughout the week, the anger that is expressed also took on
sovereignist tones, and the demonstrators then also shouted out: “Iran
out! Free Baghdad!” The Shia parties, which have been in power for
years, are indeed associated with Iran and its far-reaching impact on
the country. The symbols of the Islamic Republic (very present in the
south of the country) served as outlets for the rioters’ rage: for
example, banners and panels in tribute to Khomeini (the founder of the
Islamic Republic of Iran) were set on fire.
Who are these demonstrators? First of all, they are exclusively men;
especially young (sometimes very young), poor proletarians and
unemployed, including young graduates (those under 35 representing 70%
of the population). Demonstrations are quite spontaneous, they do not
respond to the call of any party or trade union, no leader emerges from
them. And even if locally rallies can be initiated by militants or
tribal sheikhs, they quickly become uncontrollable. At first, the
mobilization seems to concern only the Shias (who anyway represent 60%
of the population), the regions of the country and the neighborhoods of
the capital where they are in the majority. But it soon becomes clear
that the mobilization actually goes beyond community divisions, that
Sunnis participate in it, and that some mixed regions are in turn
affected.16
From the beginning, the anger of the demonstrators targeted the
political elite and its symbols, and the seats of the authorities such
as governorates, town halls or courthouses; the offices of political
parties were regularly attacked, ransacked and burned down. These young
proletarians use violence quite “naturally”, spontaneously and
impulsively. This can easily be explained by the harshness of Iraqi
daily life, by the “brutalization” that years of war have caused society
to suffer (in the sense of George L. Mosse), but also by a popular
culture that trivializes violence.17 The Iraqi government prefers to
denounce the presence of “vandals” infiltrated into the processions.
However, this immoderate use of violence seems to be spreading or at
least to be accepted by other categories of demonstrators, as the
journalist Hélène Sallon points out: “This willingness to violence was
later shared by many demonstrators. People who were not necessarily from
this angry and very young generation told me: Well yes, because we
don’t have any other choice, they don’t listen to us, they only make
promises on promises. And so, at some point, yes, why not violence.”18
How would it be without the constant calls for moderation from political
and religious authorities?
The journalist nevertheless notes a weaker mobilization in Baghdad,
perhaps because of the impact Muqtada al-Sadr has there on a portion of
the proletariat, but undoubtedly also because of a gap between militants
and young proletarians who take to the streets: “In Baghdad, we see
that this movement too was not a great success, because I have the
impression that the protest there is much more politicized, in line with
parties, and anyway we have seen in the demonstrations this summer some
divergences between these long-time activists, more politicized and
more attached to parties, and this new generation that they could not
understand and whose intentions they were not sure of. We have seen a
greater difficulty in Baghdad for the movement to make a mix, rather
than in Basra or Najaf, where socio-economic reasons are shared by
all.”19
The authorities, overwhelmed, react in urgency and disorder, becoming
only gradually aware of the extent of the revolt. For them, it is
primarily a matter of limiting the destruction, hence the introduction
of a night curfew and the deployment of riot police using tear gas and
water cannons. But, quickly, the army must contribute to protection of
the oil facilities in which protesters regularly threaten to enter. In
order to limit mobilization, the Internet is interrupted several times
throughout the country, sometimes for several days; total cuts or,
sometimes, only targeting social networks.
Prime Minister al-Abadi publicly adopts a conciliatory position towards
the demonstrators, he claimed to have understood their legitimate
demands, and he asserts that he wants to protect the right to
demonstrate (peacefully). He also pledges to accelerate water and
electricity projects in the South; he invites tribal leaders’
delegations to come and meet him, and he announces an immediate
allocation of $3 billion for the Basra region. He can hardly count on
the support of his ally Muqtada al-Sadr. Although now with one foot in
the “Green Zone”, the latter hopes, as usual, surfing the protest
without actually calling his supporters to take to the streets. The
fearless Shia leader does not hesitate to use the Twitter’s hashtag “the
hunger revolution wins”. Cautiously, he asks demonstrators to show
restraint and not to attack public buildings. After more than eight days
of demonstrations and probably much hesitation, believing that the
movement will continue, he calls on his deputies to suspend negotiations
on the formation of a new government until the demonstrators’ demands
are met.
The day of July 20th appears to be a turning point. It seems that, in
front of the police and military forces heavily deployed in the southern
provinces and in the capital, the demonstrators avoided confrontation
and gather in the main public squares. In Baghdad, several thousand
demonstrators were nevertheless trying to approach the “Green Zone”, but
the police pushed them back. The demonstrations, which have become much
less violent, continue until Sunday 22nd. It is at this moment that the
movement ends, after fourteen days of demonstrations throughout the
south of the country, including at least eight days of riots. The
repression killed 11 people, most of them shot dead. Such mobilization,
violence and repression appear to be unprecedented in Iraq.
SEPTEMBER RIOTS / WATER
One might think that after such uprising the government would be able to
enjoy a soothing respite, but that’s not the case. Everything starts
again in Basra, this time because of the water. Due to the deplorable
health and meteorological conditions, the water distributed by the
authorities has proven to be, from August onwards, much more salty and
polluted than usual. In a few weeks, its consumption even causes
intoxication and hospitalization of more than 30,000 people.
As always, the government responds by going through the motions,
imagining that the suspension of the Minister of Electricity and a few
officials will be enough to calm the confrontation and will allow the
“Green Zone” to resume its picturesque daily course. However, on Sunday,
September 2nd, hundreds of demonstrators blocked various strategic
points in Basra province. The next day, in Baghdad, the inaugural
meeting of the parliament elected in May was held. The alliance between
Muqtada al-Sadr and Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi on the one hand, and
that of the leader of the pro-Iranian militias, Hadi al-Amiri, and
former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on the other, are tearing each
other apart. But they failed to elect a Speaker of the Council of
Representatives.
On Tuesday, several thousand people gather in Basra to protest against
the authorities’ negligence. The police shot into the air and used tear
gas to disperse them, clashes broke out. At the end of the day, six
people were killed. There are even more protesters on Wednesday. On
Thursday (September 6th), access to the port of Umm Qasr was blocked by
demonstrators and, in the evening, in Basra, rioters attacked public
buildings and political parties’ headquarters. They even tried to attack
the Iranian consulate, but they were repelled by the security forces.
Fearing that demonstrations may be triggered after the Friday prayer
(which takes place at noon), the authorities deploy numerous police
forces to Basra and set up a curfew in the city from 4 p.m. But if
during the day protesters try to enter one of the oil sites near the
city, and others block Umm Qasr’s access again, it is at nightfall that
the situation escalates. Residents gathered on the streets and, in
ever-increasing numbers, they quickly attacked government buildings,
party and militia premises, the regional governor’s offices and
residence, and they burned down everything that might be. What makes a
whole lot of noise, including at the international level, is that the
Iranian consulate is stormed for the second time and that, this time, it
went up in smoke. During the night, three more demonstrators were shot
dead by the police.
The following day, Saturday, September 8th, is particularly calm in
comparison. The port of Umm Qasr resumes its activities, and the police
watch. Some activists claiming to be “organizers” of the protests
denounce the destruction of the previous day and announce that they are
stopping the movement. The curfew was finally lifted in the evening. It
should be noted that, for the first time, the commander of the PMU
declares that his troops are ready to deploy in the streets of Basra to
ensure security and protect peaceful demonstrators against agents
provocateurs.
The government is once again promising to release funds (without giving
any amount or timetable), although no one has yet seen the shadow of the
$3 billion promised in July. On the same day, Parliament met in an
emergency session in order to discuss the crisis in Basra, but part of
the assembly, including the Fatah Alliance (political wing of the PMU),
called for the resignation of Prime Minister al-Abadi. But, in a
dramatic turn of events, this call was echoed by Muqtada al-Sadr, an
ally of al-Abadi until then! The sovereignist leader thus suggests an
alliance with the pro-Iranian bloc. This turnaround was facilitated by
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s highly critical stance towards the
Prime Minister. He was finally forced to throw in the towel, and Adel
Abdel Mahdi, a former oil minister, was appointed to succeed him (he did
not take office until October 25th, 2018). The situation is still
somewhat confusing but, while some denounce the recent riots as the
result of a plot aimed at countering Iranian influence, it seems
paradoxically that the pro-Iranian bloc will be strengthened as a
result.20
Nothing that a priori could satisfy the protesters, of whom, in less
than a week, thirteen were killed and dozens more wounded. Nothing that
would indicate an improvement in their material living conditions.
However, the demonstrations did not resume, calm returned, and daily
life is getting back to normal in Basra and Baghdad. For how long?
Everyone is waiting for the next explosion and remains on guard.
But no one’s realized yet that it will take about a year to see the
Iraqi proletarians once again taking to the streets, equipped with their
incendiary anger.
End of the first part.
Tristan Leoni, November 2019
The second part, “2019. Political reform or civil war?” will be published soon.
This article in PDF [in French]
1 Quentin Müller, Mutilés de Bassora, en Irak : « J’aurais préféré
aller au paradis » [Mutilated from Basra, Iraq: “I would have preferred
to go to heaven”], Libération, August 28th, 2018.
2 On this city, we can recommend Anne Poiret’s documentary Mossoul,
après la guerre [Mosul, after the war], broadcast in 2019 on Arte.
3 The United States has granted Iraq derogations to allow it to trade
with Iran despite the sanctions imposed on that country (relating to the
nuclear agreement).
4 Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a person respected beyond the
communities for his alleged wisdom, is the highest religious authority
of Shiism in Iraq. He plays the role of arbiter, weighing the political
balance on one side or the other, always on the right side of the
current balance of power. But, because of his acceptance of the
political system since 2003, he is somewhat discredited in the eyes of
many Iraqi Shiites.
5 Quentin Müller, op. cit.
6 Teva Meyer, Reconstruire l’Irak : une mission impossible ? [Rebuilding
Iraq: an impossible mission?], DSI, n° 143, September-October 2019.
7 Muqtada al-Sadr, a nationalist leader, sovereignist and Shia populist,
enjoys immense popularity among the Iraqi Shia proletariat, but he did
not acquire it, he inherited it from his father, Ayatollah Mohammad
Sadeq al-Sadr, assassinated in 1999. Renowned for his political
versatility and maneuvering skills, embodying the opposition and the
defense of the poor, he has seen his aura somewhat tarnished since 2018
as a result of his participation in the institutional political process.
8 The “Green Zone” is a highly secure enclave in the heart of the Iraqi
capital, housing the Parliament, ministries, various institutions and
embassies. Some parts were gradually reopened to the population during
2018, after fifteen years of complete closure.
9 Noé Pignède, Le sud de l’Irak face à une crise sanitaire et économique
inédite [Southern Iraq facing an unprecedented health and economic
crisis], La Croix, November29th, 2018.
10 For a description of the city see for example: Quentin Müller,
Bassora, la Venise d’Irak en péril [Basra, the Venice of Iraq in
danger], orientxxi.info, August 30th, 2018.
11 Myriam Benraad, L’Irak est à nouveau en train de perdre la paix [Iraq is again losing peace], L’Opinion, August 22nd, 2018.
12 Let us recall here that in Iraq the weekend takes place from Friday to Saturday and that Sunday is the first day of the week.
13 It should be noted that to fire live ammunition (with a Kalashnikov)
over the demonstrators’ heads in order to frighten them and disperse
them is a common practice for law enforcement in the Middle East.
However, the maneuver is dangerous and can, even unintentionally, cause
injury or death. This method is commonly used in the demonstrations we
refer to in this text. Specifically targeting a demonstrator is
therefore only one more step that can easily be taken by a police
officer in the midst of a violent confrontation, even without any
specific order from his hierarchy.
14 Iraqi protesters withdraw from Najaf airport, air traffic resumes, alarabiya.net, July 13th, 2018.
15 Les manifestations s’étendent dans le sud de l’Irak [Demonstrations
are spreading in southern Iraq], lepoint.fr, July 13th, 2018.
16 With the exception of Kurdistan, this, because of its specific social
and political characteristics and its very high degree of autonomy,
remains on the margins of this mobilization as well as the one that
begins in October 2019. See, for example, Soulayma Mardam Bey, Pourquoi
les Kurdes d’Irak ne se soulèvent pas [Why the Kurds of Iraq do not rise
up], L’Orient le jour, November 28th, 2019.
17 Luluwa al-Rashid, L’Irak après l’État islamique : unevictoire qui
change tout ?, [Iraq after the Islamic State: a victory that changes
everything?], Ifri’s Notes, July 2017, p.14.
18 Hélène Sallon in Le soulèvement social de Bassora, symptôme des maux
de l’Irak [The social uprising in Basra, a symptom of Iraq’s problems],
October 3rd, 2018, Iremmo. Hélène Sallon, journalist at Le Monde, is the
author of the highly instructive book L’État islamique de Mossoul.
Histoire d’une enterprise totalitaire [The Islamic State of Mosul.
History of totalitarian enterprise], La Découverte, 2018, 288 p.
19 Ibid.
20 Prime Minister Al-Abadi had taken a stand in favor of Washington by
applying in turn sanctions to his Iranian neighbour, but “reluctantly”,
which provoked Tehran’s anger. ÉlieSaïkali, Lâché par Sadr, Abadi plus
isolé que jamais [Dropped by Sadr, Abadi more isolated than ever],
L’Orient le jour, September 10th, 2018.
Source in French: https://ddt21.noblogs.org/?page_id=2517
English translation: Friends of the Class war
taken from here