The given-in-one does not require reflection; on the contrary, in every conceivable case it is the condition for every reception or reflection in order to be true in the last instance. The real implies here a radical autonomy, that is, the primacy of the phenomenon over phenomenology and over the philosophical-empirical mode of a given-reception. The seclusion of the real suspends philosophical causality, but it by no means eliminates all causality, which ultimately affects thinking itself.
Vision-in-One also definitely precedes theory. It gives the One to thinking in the mode of the One and manifests exclusively in this mode every kind of philosophability for which it is the necessary precondition. Its phenomenal being cannot be derived from the history of goods or money, from the mode of “how” or from the relation between perception and what is perceived. Since it is neither sensitive nor categorical nor intellectual, the seeing in one generally remains without any intuition, but there is the phenomenon without phenomenology, the perceived without perception, the lived without life. Th Vision-in-One within the One is not to be understood as statically closed, like a point of view, for example, and it does not exceed it and it does not subtract itself from it. It mediates without needing the operation of the given, it is given in its universality with a (non)-One, or it is Other-than … (not)-one. (Unilateralism and Other-than … are not modes, ways or accidentals of the One in relation to Being, but they express the essence of immanence itself). Vision in One is given-being-without-given (without the mixture of the given and the given). (ibid.: 35f.) In this determinate and at the same time real, determining mode, the Logos finally also exists; it is reduced at this point to a highly simple event, which is moreover freed from philosophical sufficiency. On the basis of such an occasion/situation, the world of thought determines in the last instance (in the form of a clone) the Logos, which will then no longer be philosophical. On the basis of these statements, cloning, which initially concerns the philosophical material, appears to be possible in the first place, and this without contradicting the radical autonomy of the real, because even philosophy itself is ever already given in one, and moreover the real does not contradict itself if it now takes on a transcendental function qua cloning. (Ibid.: 38f.)
The clone can only articulate itself by means of non-standard philosophy (i.e. not qua philosophy, which only provides the material for cloning), and this means according to the real, which, without itself being transformed, now functions as a transcendental agent or as the essence of the foreign subject. The non-philosophical clone is thus by its very nature a transcendental entity, it realises, so to speak, the Vision-in-One on the basis of the theoretical interpretation and transformation of specific theoretical material representative of philosophicality. The transcendental (ever already linguistic) is a clone, because the One remains indispensable. (ibid.) The clone therefore implies the transcendental realisation of saying/thinking according to the One – it is transcendental and not real, but it is real in the last instance. In other words, it is the concentrated form of the complete structure of the Determination-in-the-last-instance (DLI). And cloning is radically necessary if there is to be a unified science/philosophy at all.1
What the non-standard philosophy calls cloning always consists in cloning the world, but it remains related to the real base or infrastructure. Laruelle refers to the theoretically unified objects of cloning “aspects” or “one-attributes” (Spinoza) or “uni-perspectives” (Nietzsche), which are condensed by determination in the last instance. (Laruelle 2015: 43f.) Instead of referring to the spinozistic substance and its attributes, Laruelle speaks here of the attribute-as-substance.2 In the current, quantum-theoretically inspired terms of Laruelle, one could also speak here of an undulatory noematic form of a particle that falls into immanence as transcendence – identity-without-unity in immanence, as a particle of the waveform.
The cloned attribute (aspect) that is given in One is an identity that is expressed by the Other. The clone attribute is the Other qua the material of the clone, the identity of the Other. Because of its real reason, the clone leaves the philosophical hierarchy or reversibility between one and the other and is only the other-without-difference or an aspect. And it should be noted that the One in itself or the real basis is not transformed at all by the operation of cloning or determination-in-the-last instance, because the One has only the function at this point – which is minimal-transcendental or weakly axiomatic – to make cloning possible.3
Transcendendently, cloning affects three central determinations of the non-standard philosophy, which characterises Laruelle with the terms unilateralism, universality and one-identity and which for him represent source functions that are completely “one-sided” and thus do not enter into any face-to-face representations. (Ibid. 50f.) In addition, there are innumerable sources for non-standard philosophy, which come from philosophical, political, economic, scientific, ethical and aesthetic texts and contexts, whereby the real preconditions (the real-one) of these sources remain universal and are inconsistent, because they allow all possible sources, which non-standard philosophy in turn transforms into aspects that have a relative autonomy.4 (Ibid.: 80)
The utterances and statements of the non-standard philosophy first have an axiomatic aspect, which implies that they are determinant and real in the structure of unilateral duality. But they also have a theoretical aspect in that they are determined in the last instance, that is, they “accompany” that which determines them. (Laruelle 2012: 31-32) Theorems can also function as axioms, but only under the condition that they determine other theorems in the last instance. Under these conditions, axioms and theorems do not determine two different classes of equations (sciences); neither do they establish, similar to philosophy, a reciprocal duality of propositions, whose conditions and deductions are convertible for some theoretical operations. Their “relation” or better their unilateral duality is that of determination and determination-in-the-last instance. Finally, concepts link thetic (transcendental) and empirical (immanent) contents. Here the term itself is “object” under both aspects, producing a dynamically expanding but finite meaning or a topologically localised neighbourhood of meaning, a signifying infrastructure that is related to the One, insofar as the thetic-linguistic content of the term is concerned, and to the Real, insofar the referent or thing that the term describes (the immanent content of the term) is indicated.
The radical identity of the real is universal, and at the same time it is abstract-without abstraction. Axiomatised abstraction (inseparable from abstract-without-abstraction) in turn proceeds qua various operators, namely that of names (the One, identity or human being), that of adjectives such as radical (radical identity), that of prepositions such as in- (one-in-one), without (no-consistency, no-world), non- (non-conceptual, non-definitional, non-philosophical), in person (human-in-person, one-in-person, etc.). These operators are expressions and effects of the real that are inseparable from the radical immanence of the real. It is also necessary to distinguish between immanent uni-verse identity and unification, the latter being an effect of cloning different aspects of the world of ideas. The universal is real, but can take over transcendental functions with the world of ideas qua cloning. For Laruelle, unification does not have the abstract in itself, but in the mode of a transcendental and a priori explanation, it moves from the abstract axiomatic of the real to lived experience.
For Laruelle, the conditions of reality of non-standard philosophy can be summarised in eight points (Laruelle 2012: 42-43)
1) It possesses the full meaning of immanence – solely real and yet capable of assuming a transcendental function. Laruelle is not concerned with immanence per se, but with the use of immanence in an immanent way. 2) The need to address immanence via immanence in an immanent way. 3) The already given existence of philosophy in one, its uni-lateration. 4) The structure of real immanence as uni-lateralism or other-than … 5) The pair determination and determination-in-the-final instance and the identification of the latter with Marx’s concept. 6) The unilateral duality of man and subject includes the postulate of not mixing the two terms. 7) The radical unilateralism of human messianism or the immanent future, directed towards the world, as utopia and fiction. 8) The non-philosophical subject or discourse as unified theory with mathematical/axiomatic and philosophical aspects. (ibid.)
translated by deepl