

ONTOLOGICAL WARFARE:

*Subject as Universal Singularity
vs. Object as Statist Particularity*

by Eric Schmid

In the gap [*l'ecart*] between the spaces of thought of Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière exists a topological invariant, preserved under homeomorphic transformations of the Real—the continuous deformation of **R** in the terms of *object-ifications*, the n-tuples of re-presentations, each coordinate counting according to some relative center of gravity respective to it, that is, an implicit *Master* who distributes the status quo by positive category (inscribing places of the Real with predicates, roles and functions). The topology is *collective*, as the Real constitutes itself universally by the postulation of a single axiom as True: the equality of everyone and anyone in the universal capacity to contingently declare in a moment the *subject-ivization* of a singularity (the void that is devoid of all predicates or place [*lieu*], real-ly infinitely dense with the excess of a positively New category of being).

While both thoughts reject the discourses tied to Mastery, whether it be the exceptional belonging of Judaic political theology or the logo-centric wisdom of the political-philosophical project, Badiou remains intensely theologico-political in a Pauline modality of eventual fidelity, a diagonalization of the subjective figures in the situation of “prophet” and its obverse “philosopher” to “the apostle”; on the other side, Rancière’s politics pre- and supersede the conjunction with the “theologico.” For example, Rancière demarcates the historical-epistemological definition of the “theologio-political” offered by Claude Lefort—after the dis-incorporation of the “double body” of the king, mortal and divine, democracy births the epoch of indetermination through the sacrifice of the symbolic body: the empty place left to violent reincorporations, such as totalitarianism and terrorism—as particularist, wherein the doubling of body is not an originary theological sacrifice persisting throughout time (like original sin), but the inherent opposition within which Nature itself is battling for its performative self-constitution. The “double body” is atemporal; its historicity is not an ontological dimension. So Rancière does

not constitute the division between “void” and “excess” after a moment like the event, as an ontological division demonstrated through the singular 1-off acts of subjectivity.

The following text is an attempt to outline the structural contours of identification by reading a constellation of texts by Badiou and Rancière—the Police in Rancière’s *Disagreement* and the State of the Situation in bits of Badiou’s *Being and Event* and *Saint Paul*—as to hopefully graph the torsion of the asymptotal remainders to identification: disidentification in its anti-philosophical intensities.

An attempt to summarize Badiou’s ontology, albeit somewhat simplistically:

In his magnum opus *Being and Event*, Badiou makes an ontological distinction between the positive order of Being and the Event. Being is in identity with Knowledge, which is *particularizing and objective*, since it names elements of the situation as parts or objects that occupy place within an algebra of discerned particulars, the very language of the situation that registers elements symbolically as finite totalities through encyclopedic classifications (genuses, species, etc.). Whether or not those classifications are “proper” to an element, or to definitively determine the transformation of an object in the State of the Situation, is completely indifferent since the consistency of the presentation of names is ontologically of the first order of Being, which is *immanent* to the situation, so the enumerative transformations are in relation to the transformations of the language that names parts/subsets. These are regenerated from the point at the edge of Being, the void forming the site of the Event. The Event ruptures the positive order of Being (beings, what there is), subtracting out from Knowledge something substantively New in the realm of Nonbeing (nonbeings, what

is not), deposing the constituted knowledges of the State of the Situation: a Truth that is *universalizing and subject-ive*, since the Event acts as a supplement to *all potential subjects* who create the Truth bit by bit in declaring militant fidelity to it, thereby, symmetrically, composing themselves collectively as a New subjectivity.

Badiou insists that mathematics is “the science of being-quabeing.” If “Mathematics = Ontology” and philosophy is “metaontology,” then there is somewhat of a return—through a mappable homology—to Platonic Forms: the domain of the constructed set is the realm of appearances in which a consistent multiple presents, with a localizable geometry, an instantiation of the pure multiple, a being that is inconsistent in multiple (the pure Idea). Truths oppose opinions—which he calls representations without any truth. Opinions are the material of everyday communication; opinions need only be communicable and circulate as the “cement of sociality.”¹ An element or multiple from the perspective of Opinion is approached as a constructed set (classified and represented with certain discerned, finite predicates).

Truth is of the realm of noncommunication—“what is not known”—and fundamentally unrepresentable as Totality. What Badiou calls the “void,” which is the site of an Event, is mathematically expressed as the empty set, which is included within any set. An element or multiple from the perspective of a Truth-process—declaring fidelity to the Event—is approached as a generic set (destitute of all categorical differences and classifications), infinite in the size and scope of its nondiscriminating address to *all potential subjects*. Badiou then draws a distinction between two types of multiplicity. There is the objectal, particularizing multiplicity—which is statist, as it carries its own limit, marked by a predicate, an object that it names in finite terms in the language of the situation, and the objective then becomes to void out, to annihilate, everything but the abstract, constructed multiple of a *single set* of predicate

totalities. The objective multiplicity is also multiplied by the finite objectification of the Real (as is evidenced in all discourses tied to Mastery, through the Totality of re-presentation) like the consistent multiple or constructed set.² The Power Set of any constructed set (the enumeration of all elements, the counting of all elements “as One”) is mapped to the power of the State of the Situation. Ethically, the living animal that thinks in terms of pre-identified objects (predicates that assign predicates to objects) in the constituted knowledges of the state of things is the Mortal, a being-for-death whose thought dies away just as he does. On the other hand, there is the subjective, universalizing multiplicity—which is always in excess of itself, supernumerary relative to itself and to any distributions by an objective situation (representations or the constructed sets of finite totalities); that is, destitute of all differences and therefore addressed to all subjects, who declare, as militants, conviction to the event.³ The subjective multiplicity is multiplied by the infinity of the Real, its always being in excess of being (as are the post-Cantorian transfinite sets, varying in sizes of infinity, from which Badiou’s ontology is based), and, like the generic set, is inconsistent in its multiple-being. Man is the Immortal who thinks as a subject that takes it upon himself to declare fidelity to a Truth that will last for eternity.

THE DISCOURSES OF MASTERY FOR BADIOU’S ST. PAUL

For Christ did not send me to baptize but to preach the gospel, and not with eloquent wisdom, lest the cross of Christ be emptied of its power. For the preaching of the cross is folly to those who are perishing, but to us who are saved it is the power of God. For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and thwart the cleverness of the clever. Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since, in the wisdom of God,

the world did not know God through wisdom, it pleased God through the folly of what we preach to save those who believe. For Jews demand signs and Greeks seek wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and a folly to Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men. For consider your call, brethren; not many of you were wise according to worldly standards, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth, but God chose the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and God chose the weak things of the world to confound the strong; God chose what is base and despised in the world, and even things that are not, to bring to nought things that are, so that no one might glorify himself in his presence. (1 Corinthians 1.17–29)

Paul, often referred to as the Apostle of Nations, mentions the entities “Greek” and “Jew” within the lexicon of his letters. Most famously in Letters to Galatians 3.28, Paul writes, “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female.” Badiou goes so far as to say these multiples do not refer to discrete ethno-social-religious customs, peoples, or territories, but rather refer to a set of two subjective dispositions represented by the discourses of Greek philosophy and Judaic law—the constituted knowledges of the State of the Situation of Paul’s time. St. Paul was a distant figure from Christ; he did not know him personally and only declared his fidelity to the Christ-event three to four years after the event on the road to Damascus—definitively without any memory or material witnessing of the event. For Badiou’s Paul, the event—Christ dying on the Cross and being resurrected—is not a matter of a facticity, verifiable or falsifiable, subjected to mere proof, but of conviction and faith [*pistis*]. Faith is what subjectifies:

Resurrection summons the subject to identify himself as such according to the name of faith (*pistis*)... In the guise of the event, the subject is subjectivation. The word *pistis* (faith, or conviction) designates precisely this point: the absence of any gap between subject and subjectivation. In this absence of a gap, which constantly activates the subject in the service of truth, forbidding him rest, the One-truth proceeds in the direction of all.⁴

When Paul goes to Greece, he gives a big speech to the Athenian philosophers, the usual spiel—Christ died and was resurrected—to which they all burst out laughing and leave. The subjective figure presented by the Greek *logos*, the wise philosopher, asks questions and finds answers insofar as to Master the finite totality of a thing through the allocation of the *real* place of that thing within the totality (Whole) of the cosmos. For what else is the exertion of Mastery other than the one who can master the place of each and every thing within the cosmos through the imperative of Q&A? Similarly, the Judaic commandments inscribe a predicate of finite terms in stone for eternity. What else is the subjective figure of the Jewish discourse, the prophet, other than the one who seeks to be a Master of the scripture—the Judaic law—through re-interpretation of any sign of the Messiah's coming (any signal of the exception to the Whole)?

What is the difference between posing good and bad questions? The bad questions already have answers to them (a “multiple choice” of sorts) and the good ones remain without the presupposed standardized categories. The bad questions that already have the answers, which assign the real certain objectal descriptions, falsely establishing identitarian categories as the basis and assumption for which the singularity of a thing must be explained as mastered. What he calls a “materialistic” philosophy is not the subject's radical negation of all being that is in existence, but the subtraction of a New category of Being

out from Being through declaring fidelity (a faith) to an Event in order to create a Truth (out from non-being) that becomes the basis of not just his whole life, but a subjectivity-Truth for an eternity of lives to come. St. Paul would combat the mortality, or being-toward- death, in the statist law that organized the state of things (to the commandments of Moses, which allocated the functions and roles of life, Paul would at one point say in Romans 7.11: “the law killed me”).

THE ABSOLUTE DISJUNCTION

The thought of the flesh is death, the thought of the spirit is life.
— St. Paul in Romans 8.6 (Badiou’s translation)

Alain Badiou’s antidialectic between death and resurrection presents not negation of the previous term, but instead extraction, subtraction out from the previous term. Jesus Christ subtracted with his Resurrection a New modality of being—that is, Life—out from the finite modality of being, that is Death. The antidialectical method presents an absolute disjunction between death and resurrection. There is no negation of death into resurrection, but rather, a subtraction of death, which could then, potentially but not necessarily, form the basis of a site for the Truth-Event, the void out of which the ontological situation could reinvent itself through an immanent break in the situation with an Excess of New Being, namely the modality of Life. Christ is not the mediation to know God, but a coming, an encounter that interrupts the previous regime of discourse.⁵ St. Paul presents a genuinely *New* subjective figure that opposes the Master of the two previous discourses (which Badiou compares to Lacan’s “antiphilosophical”): the apostle. Paul had said in 2 Corinthians 12.1–2: “The Lord said to me: ‘My grace is sufficient for you, for my strength is made perfect in weakness.’ I will all the more gladly glory in my weakness, that the power of Christ

may rest upon me ... for when I am weak, then I am strong.”). Just as in 1 Corinthians 1.17–29, Paul is militant in pursuing the discourse of folly and weakness, and never glorifying himself in the wisdom and knowledge of the Master. The apostle is not mediated by History (for Paul had no memory or material witnessing) but rather stands only by what can interrelate to an object that is not autonomously located with a determined place (role and function) in the order of things, but the very Real that is forever incomplete and inconsistent in its multiplicity, which the subject becomes through its faith and conviction. The Death of Christ—for Badiou’s Paul—sets the evental site within the “situation” at its void, which acts as an immanentization of the situation—subtracting a new relation, the becoming-son (God-filiating Son), out from the previous relation to the situation and God—God as transcendent Father figure. After “the sending of son,” all that matters is that Jesus was resurrected and nothing else is particular about him, imbuing a new creature devoid of predicates, the relation of the becoming-son, as in Jesus, so that we all can filiate with God as universal subjectivity.

RANCIÈRE’S POLITICS

The first requirement of universality is that speaking beings universally belong to the linguistic community. It is always dealt with in “abnormal” communication situations... Such polemical situations are those in which one of the partners of the interlocution refuses to recognize one of its features (its place, its object, its subjects).⁶

Whoever has no part—the poor of ancient times, the third estate, the modern proletariat—cannot in fact have any part other than all or nothing.⁷

Politics has no objects or issues of its own.⁸

In *Disagreement*, Rancière's entire political project starts by reexamining "the beginning" of the whole political question by zooming in on the singularity: Book I of Aristotle's *Politics*. The basis of the morphology for Aristotle arises from a performativity of subjectivity, playing on Aristotle's distinction between the human and the animal, and the distribution of sense proper to each: to speak is already to possess a *logos*, to exist as a human being within the body-politic, the "distribution of speaking bodies," that is, to be seen and recognized within the sensible field, "the partition of the perceptible," and so to have the sense to express what is useful and harmful (and thus to place in common what is just and unjust within the community of parts); to moan, to growl, or to emit noise is to possess *phonus*, which simply relates to the possession of the organ of the voice, endowed to all animals, and has a limited purpose, *merely to indicate*—not to express—what is pleasure and pain, a sense that exists outside the distribution reserved for speaking bodies (which can express the just and unjust) in order to exist within the community of parts.⁹

For Aristotle, there are three *axia* (quality or rank)—*oligio* or wealth, *arête* or virtue, and *demos* or freedom—which mark the three bodies of beings in the community: the oligarchy, the aristocracy, and the democracy. The law of the oligarchy is clearly the governance of the arithmetic of exchange. After the abolition of slavery, which promoted the submission of the balancing act of exchange and reparation, the arithmetic order, to the ideal constructions of proportion, the divine geometric order, Rancière amalgamates the law of the oligarchy with that of the aristocracy for a negative definition of *qualis* of the *demos*: without any positive quality of their own—"no wealth, no virtue"—the people appropriate freedom as their own proper quality, when in fact, the other *axia*—the oligarchy and aristocracy—share an entitlement to this right that defines the *demos'* community.

Rancière begins his political project by re-evaluating Aristotle's opposition between speaking body and organ of

the voice, as not the inherent given on which politics must be based, but rather the very dispute or contention that must institute politics itself: to manifest the wrong [*tort*] done to those speaking bodies without any qualification or political capacity (as a member of the community of parts), who are mystically deemed animals, incapable of speech, by the underlying symbolic order. To begin to come to terms with politics is to recognize the battleground of the opposition between body and voice: the wrongs done to those speechless beings who can actually speak because of the “double body” of speech. *Logos* is, in one sense, simply to possess speech, but in another sense, it is the account of speech by the social order. The social order demarcates the domain and power of *logos* based upon the “partition of perception,” and so those who are visible within the field of perception are assigned a count, namely, the privilege to speak and thus a part to place in common what is just and unjust in the community of parts.¹⁰ Those who are invisible within the field of perception are assigned no count (are unaccounted) and thus have no part in the community but *all or nothing*: no special privileges, just what is shared with *all* animals, the emission of sound (rabbling and revolting away, but tamed in perfunctory fashion by the great animal-tamers, the marked *logos*-bearers).

Politics occurs in the space between the two senses of *logos*, by the playing out of the relationship between speech and the account of it. This is to set up a series of speech acts emanating from the bodiless beings, to expose the incommensurable at the basis of the distribution of speaking bodies: to have a social order, a community of parts in measured proportion, is to understand *logos* as that which orders and gives the right to order. Society has order because there are people who command orders (the bodied, counted, *logos*-bearers) and people who obey orders (the bodiless, uncounted, *logos*-less); but for one to obey an order is already (1) to understand the order and (2) to understand that one must obey. The first understanding at the level of the *content* of the order demonstrates an inegalitarian

division between the two people—You do this! I do not!—and the second meaning at the level of *form* of the order of sensible presupposes an egalitarian division—you understand that I have *logos* and you do not, yet to understand the mark of speech is to have speech. A famous tale of Livy's, rewritten in the nineteenth century by Pierre-Simon Ballanche, highlights the revolt of those nameless beings, the Plebeians, against the community members, the Patricians, in the Roman era. Instead of staging a violent revolution, the Plebeians decided one day, through a series of speech acts, that they too could speak. They “wrote themselves a name in the sky,” conducted meetings with their own oracles, and decided that they too can draw up contracts and baptize representatives. When they meet with the Patricians who were astonished that they were speaking, the Patricians give an apologia that lasts an entire day, explaining to them that there was no way in hell they could speak. The Plebeians, having understood, knew that they too could speak, and simply listened to the apologia, thanking them only insofar as to get onto what they want to do all along: to make a treaty.¹¹ As if to re-evaluate the relationship between speech and its account, which is divided by the perceptual configuration that demarcates the domains of the *logos* and *phonos*, the Plebeians, without any measurable count in the community or partition in the perceptual order, constructed their own existence within “partition of the perceptible,” in which they could be seen and recognized within a symbolic order, and could thus, as speaking beings—they just like the Patricians— become members of the community and the body-politic by manifesting the incommensurable that escapes the count, that the adding up of the parts of the community, the multiple, never sums up to the whole. The Patricians' domination has no effectiveness other than the sheer contingency of any social order whatsoever (the absence of an *arkhe*, a beginning/founding, of community).

The police distributes *logos* to those individuals that appear within the partition of the perceptible and leaves

those without *logos* unaccounted for. The police logic is not to be confused with the petty police, concerned with “law enforcement”; the police logic is the accounting apparatus of identification, which assigns individuals the roles and functions allotted to them by their partition of the perceptible.

The police is, essentially, the law, generally implicit, that defines a party’s share or lack of it. But to define this, you first must define the configuration of the perceptible in which one or the other is inscribed. The police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise.¹²

To put it simply: the politeia of the philosophers is the exact identity of politics and the police. This identity has two aspects. On the one hand, the politics of the philosophers identifies politics with the police. It places it in the regime of the One distributed as parts and roles. It incorporates the community in the assimilation of its laws to ways of life, to the principle of the breathing of a living body. But this incorporation does not mean that political philosophy comes down to the naturalness of policing. Political philosophy exists because this naturalness is lost, the age of Khronos is behind us, and, anyway, its much-trumpeted blissfulness celebrates only the imbecility of a vegetative existence.¹³

The political philosophy project, which Rancière dismisses as the very identity of police and politics, can be read through the lens of Theodor Adorno’s philosophical negativity. For Adorno, after the Second World War, or event

of the destruction of everything, often referred to as name “Auschwitz,” humankind sat in a mode of vegetation beyond any means of conceptually identifying, for a subject to specifically identify a concept would act as a simplification of the unrealized suffering of countless victims. That is, specificity presupposes the impossibility of describing the apocalypse; hermeneutic skills for the subject are simply gone. (This may correspond to his readings of “No Thinking after Auschwitz”). Anything that can be said is not negative for Adorno; the identical is unmediated and the only immediacy is through the nonidentical: when *Inhalt* is completely emptied out and all that is left are the remainders of thought at the level of pure Form, our minimal existence. Time as Khronos has now stopped, along with the historical epoch, and if the subject were a historical category, then it is completely abdicated, for it cannot even consciously conceive of its consciousness in history because it has forgotten it. Politics, then, arises from the contention between the police logic, which is identificatory, and the egalitarian logic, which is disidentificatory. Or put in other words, there are no *rights* that articulate self-evident premises on which one is entitled to a certain place (a role and function) in the order of things (e.g., because I am a “worker,” the space of work is demarcated to the private space; because I am a “woman,” the space of life is demarcated to the home, etc.), only *wrongs*, which manifest the part who has no part in the order of things by demonstrating their (formerly unaccounted for) existence via the presupposition of the equality of everyone and anyone as speaking subjects. Rancière maintains that the egalitarian logic sets up an equality between any speaking body whatsoever, that anyone can potentially speak, even those that the police logic (the Master) identifies as incapable of such.

Any subjectification is a disidentification, removal from the naturalness of a place, the opening up of a subject space where anyone can be counted since it is the space where those of no account are counted where a connection is made

between having a part and having no part.¹⁴

For Rancière, only through disidentification are subjects actually created at a moment when the bodiless can demonstrate their capacity to actually speak by the presupposition that to understand a command is already to possess *logos*. Disidentification is always a one-act performance that can never be set up in advance, occurring through the inscription of a subject name that is different from any identifiable part of the community. It makes apparent the wrong of identification whose prescriptions are ostensibly to enable a social order to set up a community of parts, for a generality of time (manyacts), but in fact, it is ultimately and utterly contingent. A good example that Rancière reads is when, in 1832, a judge asks the revolutionary Louis Auguste Blanqui to give his profession, to which he answers, “proletariat.” The judge responds by saying “that is not a profession.” To which Blanqui responds, “It is the profession of thirty million Frenchmen who live off their labor and who are deprived of political rights.” His answer bypasses the domain of the symbolically recognized sense of the word “profession,” (a title, job, occupation, place, function) for an absolutely poetic manifestation of a new mode of subjectivity, that of the unaccounted masses. On the one hand, there is the identification that assigns a specific labor a set of properties, and the disidentification that exposes the wrong on which any societal order must base itself: the lack of account of the uncounted through the setting up of a new world in lieu of the old, one in which a new man is free to become in any sphere of activity. A subject does not exist before the subject’s declaration of wrong, for the subject name cannot be relegated to and regulated by the domain of the police logic—the identification of a community of parts. Politics, that is subjectivization, can only exist in its manifesting itself in a one-act performance, as the Plebeians or Blanqui did, for how else would one come to comprehend the singularity of a completely new and revelatory subject whose

count is always supernumerary? Already in the attempt to set up politics in advance, the subject is registered in the identitarian logic within the regime of the preestablished categories. The Real is only its very impossibility of communication. It is the disidentificatory rupture that abolishes the state of things, being as it is for a completely New modality out from a universal singularity.

1 “Every truth, as we have seen, deposes constituted knowledges, and thus opposes opinions. For what we call opinions are representations without truth, the anarchic debris of circulating knowledge. Now opinions are the cement of sociality [socialité]. They are what sustain all human animals, without exception, and we cannot function otherwise: the weather; the latest film; children’s diseases; poor salaries; the government’s villainy; the performance of the local football team; television; holidays; atrocities far away or close to home; the setbacks suffered by the Republican school system; the latest album by some hard-rock group; the delicate state of one’s soul; whether or not there are too many immigrants; neurotic symptoms; institutional success; good little recipes; what you’ve been reading; shops in which you find what you need at a ‘good price’; cars; sex; sunshine What would become of us, miserable creatures, if all this did not circulate and recur among the animals of the City? To what depressing silence would we condemn ourselves? Opinion is the primary material of all communication.” Alain Badiou, *Ethics*, 50–51.

2 Georg Cantor’s work in Modern set theory explained that the cardinality (or size) of the set of the Natural Numbers, which is infinite, is countable, while the cardinality (or size) of the Real Numbers is uncountable.

3 In Badiou’s *Ethics*, he goes on to say that the One in the first case of the objective, particularizing multiplicity is a communitarian division or the pure substance— for example, in false truth-processes of the Nazis, the objectal limit was the single predicate “Aryan” which named the pure substance. The Multiple is everyone’s being-toward-death, just as the Nazis voided everyone but the arbitrary predicate named “Aryan,” what becomes addressed to all—the “everyone” dominated by the “few”—is death. On the other hand, in the subjective, universalizing multiplicity, the One is the universality of the structure of address to all potential truth-bearing subjects.

4 Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul*, 81.

5 Alain Badiou agrees with the critique of dialectics that politics cannot be defined by contradiction as Gilles Deleuze has said. For example, the horrific totalitarianism of the Stalinist state which viewed itself as the negative necessity or mediation to sublate into a new and even better, potentially classless society, as part of the Historical Necessity that is Communism, was a reduction of the Truth- Event of the October Revolution.

6 Rancière, *Disagreement*, 56.

7 *Ibid.*, X.

8 Ibid., 31.

9 “Nature, as we say, does nothing without some purpose; and she has endowed man alone among the animals with the power of speech. Speech is something different from voice, which is also possessed by other animals also and used by them to express pain or pleasure; for their nature does indeed enable them not only to feel pleasure and pain but to communicate these feelings to each other. Speech, on the other hand, serves to indicate what is useful and what is harmful, and so also what is just and what is unjust. For the real difference between man and other animals is that humans alone have perception of good and evil, the just and the unjust, etc. It is the sharing of a common view in these matters that makes a household and a state.” As quoted in Rancière’s *Disagreement*, from Aristotle, *Politics I*, (1253) a 9–17 (London: Penguin Classics, 1992), 60.

10 For before the debts that place people who are of no account in a relationship of dependence on the oligarchs, there is the symbolic distribution of bodies that divides them into two categories: those that one sees and those that one does not see, those who have a logos—memorial speech, an account to be kept up—and those who have no logos—those who really speak and those whose voice merely mimics the articulate voice to express pleasure and pain. Politics exists because the logos is never simply speech, because it is always indissolubly the account that is made of this speech: the account by which a sonorous emission is understood as speech, capable of enunciating what is just, whereas some other emission is merely perceived as a noise signaling pleasure or pain, consent or revolt. See Rancière, *Disagreement*, 22–23.

11 Ibid., 25.

12 Ibid., 29.

13 Ibid., 64.

14 Ibid., 36.

Notes


Splitting Messianic Dialectics apart, in no particular order: A vs. B, fake vs. real, subject vs. object, T vs. A, black vs. white, full vs. empty, positive vs. negative, vice versa, etc.

by Eric Schmid

He who upholds himself in the messianic vocation no longer knows the as if he no longer has similitudes at his disposal. He knows that in messianic time the saved world coincides with the world that is irretrievably lost, and that, to use Bonhoeffer's words, he must now really live in a world without God. This means that he may not disguise this world's being-without-God in any way. The saving God is the God who abandons him, and the fact of representations (the fact of the as if) cannot pretend to save the appearance of salvation. The messianic subject does not contemplate the world as though it were saved. In Benjamin's words, he contemplates salvation only to the extent that he loses himself in what cannot be saved; this is how difficult it is to dwell in the calling.¹

Giorgio Agamben identifies a structural homology between "as if" and the condition that can be neither attributed as, on the one side, neuroses, and on the other, psychoses, but resides on the borderline. These borderline personalities act as if they were normal, as if there wasn't a problem through the pathology of repeated self-assurance, yet ultimately this forms the basis of their fundamental discomfort, their emptiness.² Splitting between the poles - black and white, thesis and antithesis, etc. - instead of synthesizing a resolution, fuels a vicious cycle where personal boundaries are highly emotional (subject to objects) and extremely hard to demarcate in gradients. Waves of grandiose delusional obsession crash as amalgamations of broken expectations inflame insecurities toward an existential being-toward-death. Objects of affection are conflated with their own self-hate, transmuted into an "impossible love," a dualism between the intensities of hyper-idealization and hypo-devaluation.

Giorgio Agamben has read Jacob Taubes' remark on Messianism - Theodor A would never believe in Walter B's full-blown Messianism (A regarded it as an "unmediated unity" between theory and praxis) so A doesn't go full-blown, but instead borderline with something Taubes calls, "as if" Messianism (an "aestheticization of Messianism"), which is "wonderful" but "finally empty," unlike B's Messianism, which Taubes calls "substantial" - with the first sentence of A's *Aesthetic Theory*, which defines beauty as "der Bann über den Bann" which translates as "the spells over spells."³ To be limited to the realm of aesthetic beauty, traumatized and doomed to a depersonalized modality of being without any substantive core or essence, is the enchantment that the philosopher has self-defeatingly placed upon himself. In *Negative Dialectics*, A writes, "philosophy lives on because the moment to realize it was missed."⁴ Through a self-casted enchantment of a world without positivity, the philosopher has missed his chance to reason, therefore he can only speculate the appearance of redemption. In "Subject and Object," A writes, "man is a result, not an *eidos*."⁵ The subject is empty without the object, but still, even with the object at hand, A acts as if in the face of "disasters," or in other words, absolute is the asymmetrical immediacy between the blind subject and objects, forsaking the possibility of Hegelian positive reconciliation.⁶ A is too stubborn to give up what he regards the most highly: negativity.



¹ Giorgio Agamben, *The Time That Remains*, p. 42

² Ibid, p. 36-37

³ Ibid, p. 35

In reference to thesis 13 of Benjamin's *Theses on the Philosophy of History* Adorno writes, "Benjamin seems to me here to be caught up in idealism... there is something in the question of time as *sui generis*." Furthermore, Adorno was skeptical of the influence of conservative conceptions of the theologico-political on a materialist conception of time; and despite Benjamin's letters to Carl Schmitt confessing his own indebtedness to Politische Theologie, Adorno denied the possibility of any such correspondence between Benjamin and Schmitt as Taubes says in *The Political Theology of Paul*. More on "as-if" Messianism on p. 74 of *The Political Theology of Paul*

⁴ As quoted in Giorgio Agamben, *The Time That Remains* p. 37

⁵ Theodor A., *Subject and Object*, 511.

⁶ For Hegel, Christ's material death insofar as to sublimate [*Aufhebung*] into the negation of the negation - positive resurrection, Infinite externalizing itself in finitude only as to reach a higher self-consciousness.

Notes

Seite 1

Splitting messianischen Dialektik auseinander.

In der Bestimmung des Realen gegen A vs. B: fake vs real, unterliegen vs Objekt, T vs A, schwarz vs Weiß, vs

von Eric Schmid

Wer sich selbst verteidigt in der messianischen Berufung keine mehr weiß, die als ob hat nicht mehr Ähnlichkeiten auf seine zur Verfügung.

Der Welt, und in dem Maß, in dem die Welt verloren ist, und dass, um Bonhoeffer's Worte zu benutzen, muss er nun wirklich zu leben in einer Welt ohne Gott.

Die Bedingung des Heils: Schenke Gott in keiner Weise. Esparung Gott ist der Gott, der ihn verläßt, und die Tatsache, Darstellungen (die Tatsache, daß die können nicht so tun

Speichern Sie die Erscheinung des Heils. Der Heil ist nicht als wäre sie gerettet wurden.

In Benjamin's Worten, sieht er das Heil nur in. Soweit er sich verliert, was können nicht gespeichert werden; Dies ist, wie schwierig es ist, in die Berufung zu wohnen ist.

Giorgio Agamben identifiziert eine strukturelle Homologie mit der Bedingung, dass kann weder zugeschrieben wie auf der einen Seite, Neurosen und auf der anderen Seite, Psychosen, sondern befindet sich auf der Grenze.

Diese Borderline-Personalitäten handeln durch die Pathologie der wiederholten Selbstbewusstsein, aber letztlich diese bildet die Grundlage für ihre fundamentalen Unbehagen, die Spaltung zwischen den Polen - Schwarz und Weiß, Arbeit und Antithese, etc. - statt der Synthese einer Auflösung, Kraftstoffe ein Teufelskreis, wo die eigenen Grenzen sind sehr emotional (Vorbehaltlich der Objekte) und extrem schwer zu Gradienten abzugrenzen.

Zusammenfassend: Die Grenze zwischen der Unsicherheit hin zu einer existenziellen Sein zum Tode. Objekt der eigenen Selbst-Hass verschmolzen, umgewandelt in einen "unmöglichen Liebe", ein Dualismus zwischen den Intensitäten der hype Idealisierung und Hypo-Abwertung.

Giorgio Agamben hat Jacob Taubes 'Bemerkung über Messianismus zu lesen - Theodor A würde nie glauben Walter B Full-geblasen Messianismus (A betrachtet es als eine "unmittelbare Einheit" zwischen Theorie und Praxis), so A nicht ausgewachsen gehen, sondern Grenze mit etwas Taubes nennt, "als ob" Messianismus (ein "Asthetisierung des Messianismus"), die "wunderbar", aber "Endlich leer", im Gegensatz zu B Messianismus, die Taubes Anruf "wesentlich" - mit dem ersten Satz Theorie, die definiert Schönheit als "der Bann über den Bann", die als "die Zauber über Zahlen in diesem Bereich der begrenzt werden Ästhetik, traumatisiert und dazu verdammt, ein depersonalisiertes Modalität des Seins ohne inhaltliche Kern oder die Essenz, ist der Zauber, der Philosoph - Selbst-defeating platziert auf sich. In *Negative Dialectics* schreibt, "Philosophie Leben, weil der Moment, um es zu realisieren durch den selbst gegossen Zauber einer Welt ohne Positivität, die Philosoph hat seine Chance verpasst Grund, daher kann er nur spekulieren werden der Erlösung. Objekt "A schreibt," der Mensch ist ein Ergebnis, nicht ein *eidos*, das Objekt, nicht ein *eidos*, auch mit dem Objekt Seite "A wirkt, ob das Gesicht von "Katastrophen" oder in anderen Worten, ist die asymmetrische absolute Unmittelbarkeit zwischen den Blinden Subjekt und Objekte, forsaking die Möglichkeit der Hegelschen positive Reconciliation, um aufzugeben, was er Hinsichtlich der am höchsten: Negativität.

¹ Giorgio Agamben, *The Time That Remains* 42

² Ebenda, S. 36-37

³ Ebenda, S. 35

In Bezug auf These 13 von Benjamin's *Thesen zur Philosophie der Geschichte* schreibt, "Benjamin scheint mir hier, um bis in Idealismus gefangen werden ...

Er ist davon der Konzeption, Versäulung, Objekt, und Adorno'schen auf einer materialistischen Zeit, und trotz Benjamin's Briefe an Carl Schmitt bekennen seine eigene Verschuldung um Politische Theologie, verweigert Adorno die Möglichkeit, eine solche Korrespondenz zwischen Benjamin und Schmitt als Theologische Theologie des Paulus

Messianismus auf SD 4 politische Theologie des Paulus Mehr zum Thema "Als-ob"

⁴ Wie in Giorgio Agamben *The Time That Remains* 37

⁵ Theodor A., *Subjekt und Objekt*, 511.

⁶ Für Hegel, Christi Tod Material soweit zu aufgehoben in die Negation der Negation - positive Auferstehung, Infinite Externalisierung sich in der Endlichkeit nur zu erreichen, eine höhere Selbstbewußtsein.

Notes

propagate the continuum of history in empirical time. Thesis V: "The true picture of the past flits by. The past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again."²⁰ The "now of recognizability" is the allotted and defined time during which a dialectical image can be read.

Though there cannot merely be alternative canons of history that through identic manner of the monuments and archives historicizes the unredeemed phenomena: there is always the dual moment of the forgotten and unforgotten, Salvation and no Salvation, the redeemed and un-redeemed, etc. B recognizes the problem in blasting time when repetition is merely replica. From Thesis XIV, "Fashion has a flair for the topical, no matter where it stirs in the thickets of long ago; it is a tiger's leap into the past. This jump, however, takes place in an arena where the ruling class give the commands. The same leap in the open air of history is the dialectical one, which is how Marx understood the revolution."²¹ Fashion's jump to the past was non-mediated, as suggested by the distinction drawn between the first kind of jump and the second jump, the latter the "the dialectical one." In order for the few moments of transcendence to not be obscured by the dominance of the homogenous time, which are nothing but "ruins upon ruins," the Now-time must blast the continuum of history. "That which is 'always-again-the-same' is not the event, but the element of newness in it."²² Here the same repeats itself as "new" in but in the same mythic nature. In the capitalistic society, newer and newer commodities present, in much like fashion does, the same old myth. "The illusion of novelty is reflected, like one mirror in another, in the illusion of infinite sameness."²³ Therefore, it is the historicist's sense of time that is mythic, while the historical materialist's sense of time is authentic.

It's not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present-to-the-past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: is not progression but image, suddenly emergent. Only dialectical images are genuine images (that is, not archaic).²⁴

The dialectical image is the frozen image. It is situated in the constellation of different Nows. The dialectical image is precisely the coincidence of Now moments, which blasts these moments to merge into an image. The dialectical image does not narrativize, prolonging the historical continuity defined by empirical time, but rather looks in the "rough and jagged places" where history is discontinuous. These places are a "hold for anyone wishing to get beyond these [continuous] points."²⁵ The materialist blasts things out of the historical continuum—but in doing so it brings about a new venture for storing images; a materialist history.

The dialectical images are placed in constellations and neighbored with repetitions of the image that are not, as they often are, the victors of the homogenous history. For example, B writes "Just as Giedion teaches us we can read the basic features of today's architecture out of buildings of the 1850s, so would we read today's life, today's forms out of the life [and] the apparently secondary, forgotten forms of that era."²⁶ Right at the heart of the dialectical image, the return to unrealized prospects is the "telescoping of the past through the present."²⁷ It is not "the 'eternal' image of the past" but rather the image of eternity.²⁸ "It is the function of concepts to group phenomena together, and the division which is brought about within them thanks to the differentiating power of the understanding is all the more significant in that it brings about two things at a single stroke: the redemption of phenomena and the representation of ideas."²⁹ Through the subdivision of concepts, phenomena fundamentally reconstitute to their elements, and with that, redeem. Concepts approximate phenomena, and when phenomena are divided in the right fixed points, into essences by the concept's virtue, the

²⁰ Walter B, *Illuminations*, p. 257

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 261.

²² Walter B, *Arcades Project*, [V, Q, 23]

²³ *Ibid*, Charles Baudelaire, p. 263

²⁴ *Ibid*, [N2a, 3], 462

²⁵ *Ibid*, V [N9a, 5], 592

²⁶ *Ibid*, [N1, 11], 458

²⁷ *Ibid*, [N7a, 3], 471

²⁸ Walter B, *Illuminations*, 262.

²⁹ Walter B, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, p. 36.

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der Vergangenheit würde nicht vermittelt, wie die Dialektik zwischen dem ersten Art von Sprung und der zweite Sprung, der gezeichnet vorgesch letztere die "die dialektische." Um für die wenigen Momente der Transzendenz, nicht durch die Dominanz der verdeckt werden homogene Zeit, die nichts als "Ruinen auf Ruinen." der Jetzt-Zeit muss das Kontinuum der Geschichte blast sind.

"Das wieder-die-gleiche" ist nicht der Fall, aber das Element der Dialektik wiederholt sich als "neu" in, aber in die gleiche mythische Natur.

In der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft, Gegenwert immer neue Waren, in viel wie Mode macht, die

Die Illusion der Neuheit wird die Fashion in der Zeit Spiel, die während der historischen materialistischen Sinne die Zeit ist authentisch.

Es ist nicht das, was vergangen ist wirft ihr Licht auf das, was vorhanden, oder, was vorhanden ist ihr Licht auf, was vergangen ist;

vielmehr ist Bild, wobei dem bisher kommt zusammen in einem Flash mit der nun zur Bildung einer Konstellation. In anderen Worten, Bild Dialektik im Stillstand.

Während das Verhältnis der Gegenwart zur Vergangenheit ist ein rein zeitliche, Ewige, das Verhältnis von Was-bas-worden die ist jetzt dialektisch: ist nicht Progression, sondern Bild, plötzlich emergent. Only dialektische Bilder sind echte Bilder (dh nicht archaisch).

Das dialektische Bild ist das Standbild.

Bild ist ein Moment der Konstellation, das die Momente des Bewusstseins und des Bildes verschmelzen zu.

Die Dialektik narrativize, verlängern die historische Kontinuität von empirischen Zeit definiert, sondern sieht in der "rough and zerklüfteten Orte", wo die Geschichte ist diskontinuierlich.

Die Dialektik einhalten für Bilder, die über das historische Kontinuum, aber damit es bringt eine neue Venture für Speichern von Bildern, eine materialistische Geschichte.

Die dialektische Bilder sind in Konstellationen gebracht und benachbarten mit Wiederholungen des Bildes, die nicht sind, wie sind sie oft, die Sieger der homogenen Geschichte.

Sowohl die Dialektik als die Bilder sind die Rückkehr zum, die so lesen wir heute Leben, die heutigen Formen aus dem Leben [und] die scheinbar sekundären, vergessene Form der Vergangenheit.

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20Walter B Illuminations 257

21Ehenda, S. 261.

22Walter B Passagen-Werk [V, Q, 23]

23Ehenda Charles Baudelaire, 263

24Ehenda, [N2a, 3], 462

25Ehenda, V [N9a, 5], 592

26Ehenda, [N1, 11], 458

27Ehenda, [N7a, 3], 471

28Walter B Illuminations 262.

29Walter B Der Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels

Konstellat zeigt sich sofort, wie es die Idee darstellt.

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constellation reveals itself immediately, as it represents the idea. "To the form of the new means of production that in the beginning is still dominated by the old one (Marx), there correspond in the societal superstructure wish images in which the new is intermingles with the old in fantastic ways."⁴⁰ In the dialectical images, the wishfulness points toward a desire, but at the same time, shows the deficiencies in that dream.

Final. - The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by redemption: all else is reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light. To gain such perspectives without velleity or violence, entirely from felt contact with its objects - this alone is the task of thought. It is the simplest of all things, because the situation calls imperatively for such knowledge, indeed because consummate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror-image of its opposite. But it is also the utterly impossible thing, because it presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a hair's breadth, from the scope of existence, whereas we well know that any possible knowledge must not only be first wrested from what is, if it shall hold good, but is also marked, for this very reason, by the same distortion and indigence which it seeks to escape. The more passionately thought denies its conditionality for the sake of the unconditional, the more unconsciously, and so calamitously, it is delivered up to the world. Even its own impossibility it must at last comprehend for the sake of the possible. But beside the demand thus placed on thought, the question of the reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly matters.²¹

Reading A's notes to Samuel Beckett's *Endgame* may serve as a tool for understanding the parts of the *Final* where he remarks upon "despair" as "the last ideology," "the impossibility" of thought, the "violence" and "distortions" of positivity that must be brought out, the naïveté of thinking as if knowledge could be "unconditional," and moreover, how it hardly matters whether a philosophy from the standpoint of redemption is a matter "of reality or unreality." For A, after the Second World War or event of the destruction of everything, often times referred to as the proper noun of "Auschwitz," humankind sat in a mode of vegetation beyond any means of conceptually identifying, for a subject to specifically identify a concept would act as a simplification of the unrealized suffering of countless victims. That is, specificity presupposes the impossibility of describing the apocalypse: hermeneutic skills for the subject are simply gone (i.e. "Thinking after Auschwitz"). Anything that can be said is not negative for A's Beckett, the identical is unmediated and the only immediacy is through the nonidentical: when *Inhalt* is completely emptied out, all that is left of our minimal existence are the remainders of thought at the level of pure *Form*. In the beginning of *Endgame*, the first words, which are also the last of Christ, express the problem of identification: it's never finished. Through the equivocation of all intentionalist meanings, the mocking of conceptual identifications as in the absurd "forlorn particulars"—the trash cans, the refrigerators, the disembodied voices, the family structure, the nature outside, the pain killers, etc.—communication proclaims the end of communication. When all that is left is to remark at the level of triviality—the almost pathological repetition of "Ah yesterday" or weather "as usual" without any true reference, pointing to nothing like an empty signifier—time has now stopped, along with the historical epoch, and if the subject were a historical category, then it is completely

³⁰ Walter B. *Arcades Project*, pp. 1224-5 (1935 expose, M1 version)

³¹ Theodor A's Zum Ende [Finale], Fragment 153, *Minima Moralia*

3. Situation der Dinge tendierend für eine solche Wissen, ja, da vollendete Negativität, einmal direkt konfrontiert, umreißt das Spiegelbild seiner Gegenteil.

Aber ist **ausreichend** **etwas** **bedeutend** **bedeutend**, auch wenn durch eine Haarsbreite, aus dem Anwendungsbereich der Existenz, während wir genau wissen, dass jede mögliche Wissen muss nicht nur der erste sein, was ist gerissen, wenn es zu halten gilt gut, ist aber auch geprägt, aus diesem Grund, von der gleichen Verzerrung und Bedürftigkeit, die es versucht zu fliehen.

Leidenschaftlicher Gedanke leugnet seine Konditionalität zum Wohle der bedingungslos, desto mehr unbewusst, und so unheimlich, ist es Sache der Welt geliefert.

Aber eigene Unmöglichkeit **muß** endlich begreifen, für die willen des Möglichen.

Aber **den** **Bedürfnisse** **notwendig** **Wirklichkeit** **der** **Unwirklichkeit** **Erlösung** **seiner** **saum** **eine** **Rolle**.

Lesen A Anmerkungen zu Samuel Beckett kann als ein Werkzeug für das Verständnis der Teilfächer dienen
 o Bemerkungen über "Verzweiflung" als "die letzte Ideologie", die "Unmöglichkeit" des Denkens, die "Gewalt" und "Verzerrungen" der Positivität, die durchgeführt werden müssen mitgebracht, denken die Naivität, als ob Wissen könnte "bedingungslos", und darüber hinaus, wie es kann eine Rolle, ob eine Philosophie vom Standpunkt der Erlösung eine Sache ist "der Wirklichkeit oder Unwirklichkeit." For A nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg oder ~~transzend~~ Zerstörung von allem, oftmals als Eigenname des genannten
 "Auswahl", setzte die Menschheit in eine Art der Vegetation jenseits jeglicher Art von konzeptionell zu identifizieren, für ein Thema zu spezifisch identifizieren ein Konzept wäre eine Verneinung der unrealisierten Leid der unzähligen Opfer handeln.
 Beckett setzt die Unmöglichkeit der Beschreibung der Apokalypse; hermeneutischen Fähigkeiten für das Thema sind einfach weg (Dh "Thinking nach Auswahl"). Alles, was ~~sein~~ nicht für die A Beckett negativ, wird die gleiche Unmittelbarkeit und
 die einzige Unmittelbarkeit ist durch die zweifelhafte Verständnis gegelt, all das ist unsere minimal nach links
 Existenz sind die Reste des Denkens auf der Ebene der Form zu Beginn des Endgame ersten Worte, die
 auch der letzte von Christus, zum Ausdruck das Problem der Identifizierung: es ist nie fertig.
 Durchschneide Beckett in die Versorption konzeptionelle Identifikationen, wie in der absurd "forlorn Angaben" die Mülltonnen, die Kuchenschänke, die körperlosen Stimmen, die Struktur der Familie, die Natur draben, die Schmerzmittel.
 zu ~~Kritiken~~ Kader Kommunikation.
 Wendungen ~~ist~~ ~~generell~~ der ~~die~~ ~~Wieder~~ ~~Trieb~~ ~~die~~ ~~trübe~~ ~~die~~ ~~politisch~~ ~~Bege~~ ~~Belebung~~ ~~ung~~ nichts, wie ein leerer Signifikant-
 Text ist nun beendet, zusammen mit der historischen Epoche, und wenn das Thema war eine historische Kategorie, dann ist es völlig

30Walter BPassagen-WerkS. 1224-5 (1935 aussetzen, M1-Version)

3ffTheodor A Zum Ende [Finale], Fragment 153, Minima Moralia

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Seite 6

danke für die es nicht einmal bewusst von seinem Bewusstsein in der Geschichte begreifen, weil sie es vergessen hat. **Thema der** Bewusstsein vergessen, sind wir nun mit dem **Vorgehen** Möglichkeit, die Unbedingtheit, die muss in den letzten Analyse aller Philosophie, die A zeit lebens versucht, über die Vereinbarkeit konfirmiert werden Dialektik

In A Erkenntnistheorie, in das Konzept, dominiert das Thema des Objekts, durch die Klassifizierung des Objektes positiv, durch identitarian Gruppierungen.

Wie wird die Singularität der Identität auf der Universalität der Vielheit identitarer Gruppierungen ausgedrückt? Das verstehen Nichtidentisches entzieht Identität wegen der Nicht-Identität, glaubt Adorno in einer "limit-Konzept", um die Konzepte effektiv ungefähr ein Objekt ohne ein Konzept der Singularität: "Sobald wir reflektieren die Single ... einzelne als Individuum, in der Form ein durchgängiges Konzept - sobald wir aufrufen, nur bedeuten die gegenwärtigen Existenz dieser bestimmten Person [oder der Sache] - wir haben es bereits zu etwas, was sich nicht als Gegenstandnahme der Begriff von B, 'die Einstellung [Konzepte] im Sternbild ... beleuchtet, was ist spezifisch für die Sache, auf die die klassifikatorischen Verfahren gleichgültig die Konstellationen dann versuchen, eine negative Dialektik configure - eine Differenz zwischen den positiven identitären Kategorien, und nur, nachdem spekuliert Denken selbst, negative Angleichung der nicht-identischen."

Schreibt, "keine Universalgeschichte führt vom Wilden zur Humanität, aber es gibt einen, der von der Steinschleuder zur Megatonnen-Bombe, eine universelle Geschichte ohne Barbare, als Subjekte nicht erschöpfend zu verstehen Objekten, so viel war für B Erkenntnistheorie in Bezug auf die Problematik der homogenen Zeit wahr: "die Einheit, die Zemente diskontinuierlich, chaotisch zersplitterten Momente und Phasen der Geschichte 'ist' die Einheit der Beherrschung der Natur, voran über Männer, und schließlich, dass über innere ~~Welt~~ ^{Welt} ~~Welt~~ ^{Welt} Zeit, sagt A, dass eine diskontinuierliche Geschichte wäre zu leicht - erliegen "reine Faktizität als das einzige, was bekannt und werden daher ~~diskontinuierlich~~ ^{diskontinuierlich} B heterogenen Zeit: "in B Arbeit die Konzepte haben eine autoritäre Tendenz, ihre eigene Begrifflichkeit ~~Wahrheit~~ ^{Wahrheit} ~~Wahrheit~~ ^{Wahrheit} Konzept muss hinterlassen Rest, dann der Veranstaltung ist Metaphysik zu hässlich, um sich in seiner absoluten Zahlen zeigen, oder ist ein so emotional fehlgeleitet dass das, was wirklich blendet ihm nicht konzeptionelle Strahlen der Positivität, sondern seine Negativität, blendete ihm vom Sehe Licht?"

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abdicated for it cannot even consciously conceive of its consciousness in history because it has forgotten it. And because the subject has forgotten its consciousness, we are now presented with the despair, the impossibility, the unconditionality, which must be faced in the last analysis of any philosophy, which A throughout his life attempts to reconcile through the negative dialectic.

In A's epistemology, in the concept, the subject dominates the object, by classifying the object positively, by identitarian groupings. But what the positive identitarian concept always misses is the "nonidentity," for all it can do is describe the singularity in terms of universal kinds - which exchange particular elements - and never understand das Nichtidentische that eludes identity.³² Because of the nonidentity, Adorno believes in a "limit-concept" to which concepts can effectively approximate an object without having created a concept of the singularity: "As soon as we reflect upon the single... individual as an individual, in the form of a universal concept - as soon as we cease to mean only the present-existence of this particular person [or thing] - we have already turned it into a universal."³³ Therefore A suggests, borrowing the term from B, "setting [concepts] in constellation... illuminates what is specific to the thing, to which the classificatory procedure is indifferent."³⁴ A's constellations then attempt to configure a negative dialectic - a differential between the positive identitarian categories, and, only, after having speculated upon thought itself, negatively approximate the non-identical. A writes, "no universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb."³⁵ There is no universal history without barbarism, as subjects cannot exhaustively understand objects, so much was true for B's epistemology with respect to the problematics of homogenous time: "the unity that cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered moments and phases of history" is "the unity of the control of nature, progressing over men, and finally to that over men's inner nature."³⁶ At the same time, A says that a discontinuous history would too easily succumb to "pure facticity as the only thing to be known and therefore accepted."³⁷ He rebukes B's heterogeneous time: "in B's work the concepts have an authoritarian tendency to conceal their own conceptuality."³⁸ If the concept must leave a remainder, then after the event is metaphysics too ugly to show itself in its absolute terms or is A so emotionally disregalated that what really blinds him are not conceptual rays of positivity but his negativity, blinding him from seeing the light?

³² Theodor A, *Negative Dialectics*, p. 53

³³ Theodor A, *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*, p. 251.

³⁴ Theodor A, *Negative Dialectics*, p. 162

³⁵ Ibid, p. 320

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Ibid, p. 319-320

³⁸ Ibid, p. 62

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³²Theodor A, *Negative Dialectik* 8, 53

³³Theodor A, *Critical Models: Interventions und Schlagwörter*, 251

³⁴Theodor A, *Negative Dialectik* 8, 162

³⁵Ebenda, S. 320

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ebenda, S. 319-320

³⁸Ebenda, S. 62

